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The third chapter of Ernest Sosa’s latest book bears the title ‘Value Matters in Epistemology’. 
Interpreted as a declarative statement, this title captures a growing sentiment among 
epistemologists, many of whom have recently turned their attention to certain long-neglected and 
robustly normative dimensions of the cognitive life. This turn has resulted in an explosion of 
literature in recent years on topics like virtue epistemology, the epistemic value problem, 
epistemic luck, credit theories of knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. Sosa’s work has been 
at the center of many of these debates. Knowing Full Well is the latest and most sophisticated and 
mature statement of his views on several of the relevant topics. It is a must-read for anyone with 
an interest in normative epistemology.  
 
The substance of the book derives from Sosa’s inaugural Soochow Lectures in Philosophy, 
delivered at Soochow University in Taipei in 2008. The overriding thesis of the book is that 
epistemic normativity is a species of a more general and familiar kind of normativity: viz. 
performance normativity. More specifically, Sosa’s claim is that beliefs are cognitive 
performances evaluable in terms of norms and principles that apply to performances more 
broadly, and that knowledge is a cognitive performance that satisfies these norms. After laying 
out this account with characteristic care and precision, Sosa considers its bearing on several 
issues and debates in epistemology, including the Gettier problem, the value problem, 
contextualism, the nature of perceptual experience, testimony, and epistemic circularity.  
 
Readers already familiar with Sosa’s influential work in epistemology are likely to wonder how 
this volume figures relative to two of his other recent and similarly themed works: A Virtue 
Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Reflective Knowledge (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). In A Virtue Epistemology, Sosa introduced the idea that 
knowledge is a cognitive performance and applied this model to a host of epistemological issues. 
In this regard, its project is similar to that of Knowing Full Well. However, the present account of 
the performative aspects of knowledge is more detailed and nuanced than what is found in Sosa’s 
previous work. Knowing Full Well also extends this account in new directions and applies it to 
new problems. Sosa’s other recent book, Reflective Knowledge, mainly addresses the problem of 
epistemic circularity. While Knowing Full Well contains a chapter on epistemic circularity that 
draws on some of this work, its overlap with Reflective Knowledge is minimal. In short, Knowing 
Full Well is best viewed as elaborating on, further defending, and extending positions that Sosa 
has gestured at or developed previously. It is worth reading even for those already well-
acquainted with his work. 
 
In Chapter 1, Sosa lays out a performance-based account of knowledge. He begins by noting that 
performances in general are ‘apt’ just in case they reach their goal in a way that manifests the 
performer’s competences or virtues (rather than by luck, say). A performance is ‘meta-apt’ only 
if it involves a correct sense of the risk-related appropriateness of the performance and this sense 
is itself arrived at in a way that manifests certain meta-competences of the performer (p. 8). A 
performance is ‘fully apt’ when its aptness manifests its meta-aptness (p. 10). Thus an archer’s 
shot is fully apt if: she hits her target; her hitting of the target manifests her archery skills; she 
has a correct sense of the appropriateness of her shot; this sense manifests a kind of archery-
relevant meta-competence; and this sense in turn is manifested by her competent hitting of the 
target. 
 
According to Sosa, knowledge is a ‘special case’ of precisely this kind of normative structure 
(pp. 11-12). Again, Sosa thinks of beliefs as cognitive performances. Thus he holds that a belief 
is apt just in case it is true and true in a way that manifests the believer’s epistemic competences 
or virtues. Such aptness is necessary and sufficient for ‘animal’ knowledge. A belief is meta-apt 
when it involves a correct second-order sense of the appropriateness of the belief (e.g. an 
accurate sense that it is appropriate for one to believe in the present case rather than to suspend 
judgment). A belief that is both apt and meta-apt amounts to ‘reflective’ knowledge. Finally, to 
reach the ‘epistemic heights’ or to be fully apt, a belief’s aptness must manifest its meta-aptness, 
that is, the believer’s competent reaching of the truth must manifest (e.g. by guided by) the 
believer’s sense of its appropriateness. This amounts to ‘knowing full well.’  
 
In Chapter 2, Sosa articulates a sense in which belief aims at truth that fits with the model of 
knowledge developed in the preceding chapter. He argues that for a belief to count as knowledge 
the believer in question must endeavor to reach the truth. Knowledge, he claims, requires an 
agency-implicating ‘pursuit of truth’ (p. 22).  
 
In Chapter 3, Sosa continues to elaborate on and explore the normative dimensions of his 
performance-based model. He defends an ‘affirmative’ (vs. a ‘threshold’) conception of belief, 
addresses the relation between apt belief and apt action, explores the connection between the 
intuitive value of knowledge and the knowledge norm of assertion, and offers an explanation of 
the sense in which knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.  
 
Chapters 4 and 5 situate Sosa’s theory of knowledge relative to competing (or apparently 
competing) views. In Chapter 4, Sosa defends a virtue-theoretical, performance-based 
conception of knowledge against a ‘knowledge first’ account and against a traditional indirect 
realist account of perceptual knowledge. In Chapter 5, he argues that contextualism is best 
understood as a linguistic thesis concerning features of our ordinary usage of epistemic 
terminology and that consequently it fails to have direct implications for any substantive issues 
in epistemology proper.  
 
The remaining three chapters involve elaborating on and defending aspects of the model laid out 
in Chapters 1-3. In Chapter 6, Sosa develops a conception of sensory experience intended to 
comport with a performative conception of knowledge. It involves thinking of experience as 
intrinsically propositional or as constituted by an experiential relation to phenomenal 
propositions. Chapter 7 examines the mechanics of knowledge acquired by way of instruments 
and compares this way of knowing to knowledge gained via the senses and testimony. In Chapter 
8, Sosa distinguishes between vicious and non-vicious varieties of epistemic circularity and 
argues that the circularity involved in his notion of meta-aptness is non-vicious.  
 
As this brief summary suggests, I take the heart of Sosa’s book to be the material in Chapters 1-
3. Thus my assessment of the book will focus on the discussion in these chapters. I begin with 
two general lines of applause.  
 
Sosa’s account of the normative structure of performances in general is illuminating and 
compelling. And his claim that knowledge is a cognitive performance that embodies this 
structure is ingenious. Indeed, the theory of epistemic excellence contained in Knowing Full Well 
is one of—perhaps the—most sophisticated and impressive in the literature. One attractive result 
of the theory is that knowledge comes off looking like a reasonably familiar and comprehensible 
phenomenon. If knowledge is essentially a kind of performance, and if Sosa’s account of 
performance normativity is correct, then given our general familiarity with performances and 
their value, it turns out that we are already well-acquainted with the structure and value of 
knowledge. This is very different from and more appealing than the impression one gets from 
standard analyses of knowledge, many of which of make knowledge look like an incredibly 
complex, foreign, and even impenetrable notion.  
 
Thinking of knowledge in performative terms has a further advantage. Performances are 
intentional and active. Accordingly, Sosa’s commitment to thinking of knowledge as a 
performance leads him to offer a psychologically more robust and rigorous account of 
knowledge than in previous work. This is especially evident in his treatment of epistemic agency 
in Chapter 2. Here he defends what might be referred to as an ‘agency requirement’ on 
knowledge (pp. 19, 22). As noted above, Sosa insists that one acquires knowledge only if one 
‘endeavors’ to reach the truth. This requirement holds for animal and reflective knowledge alike. 
While such endeavoring need not be conscious, explicit, or deliberative, Sosa does insist that it 
be ‘substantial’ (p. 16). 
 
This requirement brings Sosa’s thinking about knowledge into closer proximity with that of 
‘virtue responsibilists,’ who think of intellectual virtues as good intellectual character traits like 
fair-mindedness, open-mindedness, intellectual honesty, and intellectual courage. Some virtue 
epistemologists (e.g. Linda Zagzebski in Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) think of knowledge (roughly) as true belief that arises from intellectually virtuous 
motives like a desire for truth. While Sosa would likely stop short of embracing Zagzebski’s 
motivational requirement, the language he uses to describe the agency requirement noted above 
is surprisingly similar. For instance, he describes the notion of ‘endeavoring’ to reach the truth in 
terms of ‘a pursuit of truth’ (pp. 19-20), ‘caring’ about reaching the truth (p. 17), a desire to ‘get 
it right’ (p. 21), ‘weighing reasons’ (p. 23), and ‘a desire for truth’ (p. 33).  
 
Some kind of convergence between ‘virtue reliabilist’ and ‘virtue responsibilist’ theories is 
overdue. In this respect, Sosa’s attention to the agential or characterological dimensions of 
knowledge is an important and welcome development. As Sosa himself points out, this broader 
focus allows him to overcome a familiar objection to virtue reliabilism that accuses the approach 
of giving insufficient attention to the knowing person or agent (p. 20).  
 
I turn now to address three significant features of Sosa’s account of knowledge that I think merit 
further probing. In each case, the issues involved are complex enough that, given the limits of 
this review, I can provide little more than a sketch of the relevant concern.  
 
The first concern pertains to Sosa’s ‘agency requirement’ noted above. While I applaud Sosa’s 
attention to the agential or characterological dimensions of knowledge, the question arises 
whether he has gone too far in making something like an exercise of epistemic agency necessary 
for knowledge. The most serious challenge for such a requirement is posed by cases of so-called 
‘passive,’ ‘brute,’ or ‘mechanical’ knowledge (see my The Inquiring Mind, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Ch. 3). Such knowledge is the product of the natural or default operation of a 
person’s native cognitive endowment. It might include my knowledge that, say, loud music is 
playing in the room, that there is a throbbing pain in my left foot, or that a large colored object 
has just entered my visual field. These and related beliefs seem like clear candidates for 
knowledge and yet their truth does not appear to ‘manifest’ even an implicit or subconscious 
‘endeavor’ to reach the truth. What it manifests, rather, is the brute or default functioning of 
certain cognitive faculties (e.g. hearing, introspection, and vision). Such functioning is, for 
instance, the real reason or explanation of why the beliefs in question are true.  
 
At one point Sosa considers an objection along these lines (p. 16). His response is that while at a 
conscious or explicit level the persons in question might not be ‘endeavoring’ to reach the truth, 
at a deeper, subconscious level they are. This reply strikes me as dubious, especially if it is 
intended to cover the full range of cases of mechanical knowledge. In any case, the plausibility 
of the reply depends ultimately on how exactly we are to understand Sosa’s notion of 
‘endeavoring.’ He takes pains to make clear that this should not be understood in a weak or 
metaphorical way (pp. 16, 64). This lends plausibility to the idea that knowledge is a genuine 
cognitive performance. But whether thinking of knowledge as a cognitive performance requires 
a demanding conception of ‘endeavoring’ may be an open question. Therefore, it may be open to 
Sosa to adopt a sufficiently weak account of ‘endeavoring’ while still thinking of knowledge in 
robustly performative terms.  
 
A second area that merits further scrutiny concerns Sosa’s attempt to handle what I shall refer to 
as the ‘luck dilemma’ in epistemology. The notion of epistemic luck has received a great deal of 
attention within epistemology in recent years (see e.g. Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). One lesson that has emerged from the relevant literature 
is that knowledge is inconsistent with certain kinds of luck but consistent with others. Gettier 
cases, for instance, involve a kind of luck that undermines a belief’s epistemic status. Accurate 
testimonial beliefs also involve a kind luck: reaching the truth on the basis of testimony depends 
little on one’s own cognitive efforts; rather, it depends primarily on the cognitive activity of 
one’s informants (or on the activity of their informants, etc.). Unlike Gettier luck, ‘testimonial 
luck’ is compatible with knowledge. Accordingly, the requirements of a plausible analysis of 
knowledge must be demanding enough so as to preclude Gettier luck while nevertheless being 
weak enough to permit testimonial luck.  
 
Sosa’s takes pains to show that his conditions for knowledge are weak enough to allow for 
testimonial luck (pp. 86-90). He says that a person S can know that p on the basis of reliable 
testimony provided that the truth of S’s belief partially manifests one of S’s epistemic 
competences. He adds that S’s contribution to the truth of his belief may in fact be ‘quite limited 
or small’ (89). While this seems like a plausible way around the problem posed by testimonial 
luck, the question naturally arises whether Sosa’s conditions for knowledge are demanding 
enough to rule out Gettier luck. This depends, ultimately, on how exactly we are to understand 
Sosa’s notion of ‘manifesting’. 
 
Suppose, for instance, that a person S forms a true belief that p on the basis of a perfectly 
intellectually virtuous (e.g. careful, thorough, honest, etc.) collection and assessment of a given 
body of evidence E. Suppose further, however, that E was fabricated and planted by someone 
with a vested interest in making S believe that p. S’s belief is Gettiered and thus falls short of 
knowledge. Does it satisfy Sosa’s manifesting requirement? That is, does the truth or correctness 
of S’s belief at least partially manifest S’s cognitive virtues? Suppose we stipulate, plausibly 
enough, that if S had not exercised these competences, if he had not inquired and formed his 
belief with such care and thoroughness, he would have formed a false belief. On this variation of 
the case, there would at least appear to be a sense in which the truth of S’s belief manifests his 
cognitive virtues.  
 
Sosa does not, to my mind, say enough about the notion of ‘manifesting’ to make clear whether 
his account of knowledge can handle cases of this sort. Consequently, I think it is at least an open 
question whether the account is capable of overcoming the luck dilemma.  
 
A third and final issue concerns Sosa’s reply to the value problem in epistemology. On the 
standard conception of this problem, an analysis of knowledge ‘solves’ the value problem just in 
case it makes proper sense out of the intuitive superiority of knowledge vis-à-vis mere true 
belief. Sosa’s discussion of this and related issues in Chapter 3 is remarkably rich and 
illuminating. He identifies a wide range of dimensions of epistemic value and for each one 
considers whether or the extent to which it might explain the unique value of knowledge. 
Ultimately he settles on the view that knowledge—understood as successful cognitive 
performance—is always more valuable than mere true belief because knowledge but not mere 
true belief necessarily involves a second-order preference for the satisfaction of a certain first-
order preference that is ‘proper’ to performances in general (viz. a preference for aptness). This 
combination of second- and first-order preferences is valuable, on Sosa’s view, because its 
absence amounts to a kind of ‘rational incoherence’. Sosa concludes that while knowledge may 
not always be more valuable than the corresponding mere true belief all things considered, it is 
always better in the respect just identified (pp. 61, 65-66).  
 
I have two concerns about this response. First, even if knowledge is necessarily more valuable 
than mere true belief in the relevant respect, it is not clear that Sosa has solved the value 
problem. As indicated above, this requires making sense of what is supposed to be a substantive 
and widely held intuition to the effect that knowledge is superior to mere true belief. However, as 
will become clearer momentarily, the epistemic value pinpointed by Sosa is fairly narrow and 
thin. Consequently, I find it hard to believe that this is the value we have in mind when we judge, 
from the relevant intuitive standpoint, that knowledge is superior to mere true belief. This in turn 
leads me to wonder whether Sosa has in fact identified the sought after value. (For more on this 
point, see my ‘Is There a Value Problem?’ in Epistemic Value, eds. Adrian Haddock, Alan 
Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 42-59). 
 
I think it is also worth asking whether in fact knowledge is always more valuable than mere true 
belief even in the limited respect identified by Sosa. Underlying Sosa’s view is the idea that, for 
any first-order preference, it is always better, in respect of rational coherence, to have a second-
order preference that supports the first-order preference than it is to have no second-order 
preference at all or a second-order preference that conflicts with the first-order preference. While 
this principle is broadly plausible, it runs aground with respect to certain cases. Compare, for 
instance, a ‘rationally coherent’ abusive spouse with one that is ‘a-rational’ (no second-order 
preference) and another that is irrational (conflicting second-order preference). On Sosa’s view, 
the rational coherence of the first spouse is a genuine good; therefore, in this respect, the first 
spouse is ‘better than’ either of the other two. This seems to me a dubious assessment. On the 
contrary, what cases like this seem to suggest is that a second-order preference is good only if the 
object of the corresponding first-order preference is good. Alternatively: the value of a second-
order preference is parasitic on the value of the corresponding first-order preference, which in 
turn is parasitic on the value of the object of the first-order preference.  
 
What bearing does this have on the value problem? Sosa argues at length and convincingly that 
some true beliefs are epistemically worthless (pp. 56-60). If the principle just articulated is 
correct, it follows on Sosa’s view that some knowledge (viz. knowledge of ‘epistemically 
worthless’ facts or subject matters) lacks the kind of value that he claims is unique to it and thus 
that knowledge understood in Sosa’s terms is not always more valuable than mere true belief.  
 
None of the foregoing probing or critical remarks is intended to be decisive. The issues involved 
are subtle and complex; and Sosa’s treatment of them is more extensive and nuanced than I have 
been able to do justice to here. I hope the discussion has, however, elucidated some interesting 
questions and loose ends that might profitably be taken up by Sosa’s supporters and critics as 
they digest this very important work.  
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